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I. Introduction 
A report from the New England Journal of Medicine reported a steady increase in the 
number of natural disasters1 in the past few decades with over two million people reported 
killed between 1980 and 2004 according to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disaster (CRED). This problem has been compounded by the number of climate-related 
incidents such as storms and floods. In addition to the increasing frequency, the expanding 
scope of damage of natural disasters has been concerning for the international community at 
large2. It becomes more pressing, then, to further explore and understand the drivers of 
recovery and any political-economic factors that may contribute to this goal.  
Inequality and corruption as some of these facets have received much attention from 
institutional scholars and economists alike but have not yet been studied in the context of 
post-disaster recovery. This paper, then, will examine inequality and corruption, specifically 
in its ability to predict international aid that flows into a country in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster to meet the immediate and long-term goals of the affected country. The paper find 
corruption, measured through Transparency Internationals’ Corruption Perception Index, 
controlled for estimated damage and number of people killed has a coefficient of -0.48 in 
predicting the log of total international donations, significant at a five percent level. The Gini 
coefficient, on the other hand, as a proxy for inequality was found to have a significant 
coefficient of -0.057 at the 10 percent level.  The two results are seemly contradictory: while 
higher inequality is correlated with lower donation, higher corruption is correlated to higher 
                                                          
1 Leaning, J., & Guha-Sapir, D. (2013). Natural disasters, armed conflict, and public health. N Engl J 
Med, 369(19), 1836-1842. 
2 Riebeek, H. (2005, March 25). The Rising Cost of Natural Hazards : Feature Articles. Retrieved April 
25, 2016, from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/RisingCost/ 
donations. The implication behind this finding appears to be that though corruption and 
inequality are loosely related, they have different relationship with donations. While the 
result cannot speak to the casual relationship of inequality and corruption with international 
donations, it provides fertile ground for future research.   
II. Literature Review 
Due to the increasing number and scope of natural disaster, there is a rich body of 
literature to better understand factors that drive resilience, or the ability to “bounce back” 
from natural disasters. Researchers have found that countries with higher income, 
educational attainment, and greater openness, more complete financial systems and smaller 
governments experience fewer losses3. Others note that social capital,4 or networks, are key 
determinants of recovery, especially at a community level. Moreover, as most victims of 
natural disasters live in low-income countries with limited resources, donations from “richer 
countries could play a key role” in meeting immediate needs and working towards long-term 
recovery, according to Stromberg5. A study by Becerra and his colleagues found that the 
median increase in Official Development Assistance in the aftermath of large natural 
disasters was 18 percent6, showing that the international community does respond to the 
needs of the affected country in its assistance for development. While some scholars argue 
that international disaster assistance, especially U.S. foreign aid is shown to be the most 
                                                          
3 Toya, H., & Skidmore, M. (2007). Economic development and the impacts of natural 
disasters. Economics Letters, 94(1), 20-25. 
4 Aldrich, D. P. (2011). The power of people: Social capital's role in recovery from the 1995 kobe 
earthquake. Natural Hazards, 56(3), 595-611. 
5 Strömberg, D.. (2007). Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives,21(3), 199–222. 
6 Becerra, O., Cavallo, E., & Noy, I. (2014). Foreign aid in the aftermath of large natural disasters. Review 
of Development Economics, 18(3), 445-460 
prominently determined by foreign policy and domestic consideration,7 international aid in 
the face of natural disaster plays a key role in funding the needs of the affected country.  Of 
interest is how inequality and corruption, which has economic, political and societal 
implications on the standing of a nation in the international community.  
First, we examine the body of literature surrounding inequality. While inequality can 
refer to disparities in consumption, income or wealth, this paper will focus on income 
disparity, as measured by the Gini coefficient for consistency of data. In the context of 
development, perhaps the most renowned theory is known as the Kuznet’s curve, proposed 
by Simon Kuznet in the 1950s. His groundbreaking theory proposed an inverted “U” 
relationship between inequality and per capita income8. The rationale behind this proposal 
was that with rapid industrialization, and accordingly, the centralization of wealth in cities, 
the benefits will not be evenly distributed among citizens. While his theory has been 
criticized by the existence of counterexamples, most notable, the economic development of 
East Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore9, 
Kuznet provides an interesting framework in which to understand level of development and 
inequality.  
Inequality, on a societal level, is shown to have significant effects, including increased 
mortality rates for the poor and reduction in social cohesion.10 While both have alarming 
                                                          
7 Drury, A. C., Olson, R. S., & Belle, D. A. V. (2005). The politics of humanitarian aid: U.S. foreign 
disaster assistance, 1964?1995. Journal of Politics,67(2), 454-473. 
8 Kuznets, S.. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality.The American Economic Review, 45(1), 
1–28. 
9 Stiglitz, J. E. (1996). Some lessons from the east asian miracle. The World Bank Research 
Observer, 11(2), 151-177 
10 Kawachi, Ichiro, et al. "Social capital, income inequality, and mortality."American journal of public 
health 87.9 (1997): 1491-1498. 
considerations, reduction in social cohesion, otherwise known and social capital have wide-
stretching ramifications for the economic growth of a nation. Knack and Keefer11 were some 
of the first to provide evidence that “social capital” matters for measurable economic 
performance. Many institutionalists agree that this link is perhaps due to the link between 
social capital and generalized trust12 and since higher generalized trust is shown to lower the 
cost of doing business, inequality is a noteworthy factor in rebuilding of an economy post-
disaster. Furthermore, Robert Barro from the National Bureau of Economic Research found 
that higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries and encourage growth in richer 
places13, which is reminiscent of Kuznet’s theory discussed previously.   
Corruption, like inequality, has multiple definitions. One of the definitions, which this 
paper will focus on for this paper, is “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge 
of public duties by bribery or favor.14” Most common form of measurement is through 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which through expert opinion 
attempts to capture the perceived level so public sector corruption worldwide. While some 
researchers have found that in the face of deficient institution frameworks, corruption 
increases efficiency15, many have also found that corruption lower investments, thereby 
lowering economy growth16. The interplay between corruption and income inequality has 
been previously examined by Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme at the International 
                                                          
11 Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country 
investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(4), 1251-1288. 
12 Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized 
trust. Comparative politics, 441-459. 
13 Barro, R. J. (1999). Inequality, growth, and investment (No. w7038). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
14 Theobald, R. (1990). What is Corruption?. In Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment (pp. 1-
18). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
15 Méon, P. G., & Weill, L. (2010). Is corruption an efficient grease?. World development, 38(3), 244-259. 
16 Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 681-712. 
Monetary Fund in 2001, who found there is evidence of high and rising corruption increasing 
income inequality and poverty in a country17. Moreover, they note that the relationship may 
be explained by the fact that corruption interferes with one of the core functions of 
government, namely, the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. 
Overall, the literature review of inequality and corruption exemplify effect of inequality 
and corruption for growth, which is a crucial question in the sense that natural disasters are 
supposed to set back growth for a decade in the affected country. Donations, help bridge that 
gap, so if corruption and inequality affect donations, too, could provide policy implications 
that further emphasize the importance of improving transparency and equity in countries that 
are prone to natural disasters. 
 
I. Methodology  
 
A. Data Set 
The dataset covers all major natural disasters worldwide from 2003 and 2013. The variable 
of interest, grand total of international aid was tracked taken from publicly available data 
from Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service 
(FTS), which “records all reported humanitarian aid contributions,” according to its website.  
Then, total affected, fatalities, estimated damage (in millions of USD) information was 
obtained from EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database, maintained by the Centre for 
                                                          
17 Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and 
poverty?. Economics of governance, 3(1), 23-45. 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster and matched with information gathered through 
FTS. Gini Coefficient, Population and GDP information was taken from the World Bank’s 
Database and also recorded. Finally, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a measure of 
corruption within the affected country, was accessed from Transparency International’s 
database.  
If the data was missing any of the listed variables, the entry was dropped for incomplete 
information. The data was then narrowed to focus on storms, earthquakes and floods, the 
predominant natural disaster type in the data set. Explicitly, the removal of mass movement 
and volcano activity removed 17 observations from the data set.  This resulted in a sample 
size of 1101 with a mean of around 86 MM USD of grand total in international donation. The 
model was fitted using JMP, a statistical software.  
 
B. Independent Variable  
The metric of interest is the dollar amount of donations, labeled “grand total” in the data 
set. The FTS database, from which the independent variable was recorded, does provide a 
reliable and comprehensive tracking of international aid by natural disaster. There are, 
however, a few things to note about the dataset. First, the data set is heavily skewed by a few 
data points including (Table 1), Earthquake in Japan 2010, Typhoon in the Philippines in 
2013 and Indian Earthquake in 2005, which are outliers in the amount of donations that it has 
received.  
 
                        Figure 1 Distribution of Grand Total of International Aid 
 
To temper the effect of these outliers, the logarithm of the independent (Table 2) is fitted 
against dependent variables. The transformed independent variable provides a relatively 
normal distribution. Second, the donations are a combination of aid from countries, 
organizations, corporations, foundations and religious groups. The donation was donated 
either directly to the bilateral, meaning the affected government, or to an external party, often 
the Red Cross or other UN-affiliated organizations.  
 
                     Figure 2 Distribution of Log Grand Total of International Aid 
 
 
 
 C. Dependent Variables  
All variables that were initially collected as part of the data set were analyzed for 
correlation. The top indicators were picked based on independence from each other. In 
particular, total affected was dropped due to its correlation with killed and GDP/ capita was 
dropped due to its high correlation with estimated damages. At the end the following four 
variables were chosen for the base model.  
i) Estimated Damages: measured in millions of dollars, estimated damages, for the purposes 
of consistency were based off an external estimate done by the EM-DAT.  
ii) Fatalities: similar to estimated damages, in order to ensure integrity of the data, the 
measurements were taken by EM-DAT, an external source that measured the casualties of 
each disaster. The units are in number of persons that was killed the disaster.  
iii) Gini: measured from zero to 100, the Gini coefficient is regularly measured by a variety 
of organizations. The data was again taken from the World Bank to mediate potential biases 
that may arise from self-reported Gini coefficients. A higher Gini indicates a more unequal 
distribution of income.   
iv) CPI: Measured on a scale of zero to ten, measured to the first decimal point, CPI is 
recorded by Transparency International, an independent organization.  
 
II. Results and Discussion 
 
A. Base Model  
Based on literature and previous work, a few preliminary analysis was done to identify dependent 
variables, along with interaction variables that were promising candidates. Finding that the number of 
people killed, disaster type and estimated damages have significant coefficients. The basic model 
came with a relatively weak R-square of .225 with 141 observations analyzed. The results of effects 
test and parameter estimates are outlined below in Table 1 and 2 respectively.   
 
TABLE 1— EFFECTS TEST OF BASE MODEL 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 39.663235 3.8981 0.0226* 
Killed    1 1 76.092259 14.9566 0.0002* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 27.883615 5.4808 0.0207* 
 
TABLE 2— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL  
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  14.661137 0.20779 70.56 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
 
 0.4566157 0.324334 1.41 0.1615 
Disaster Type[Flood]   -0.733836 0.263693  -2.78 0.0062* 
Killed  3.2859e-5 8.496e-6 3.87 0.0002* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  0.0000243 1.038e-5 2.34 0.0207* 
 
     
       
     
 
The results signify that the variables Killed and Est. Damages has a positive relationship with 
log of total donations, while the categorical variable of disaster flood has a different effect on the 
independent variable based on if the disaster is an earthquake or a flood. The addition of an 
interaction variable, Disaster Type*Killed create a model that has a higher R-squared of 0.27. 
The findings are summarized in Table 3 and 4 below.  
 TABLE 3— EFFECTS TEST OF BASE MODEL W/ INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 36.249091 3.7719 0.0255* 
Killed    1 1 50.645312 10.5398 0.0015* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 26.113653 5.4345 0.0212* 
Disaster Type*Killed    2 2 48.011674 4.9958 0.0081* 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL W/ INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  14.534236 0.206018 70.55 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
 
  -2.506358 1.002297  -2.50 0.0136* 
Disaster Type[Flood]  5.2174961 1.924216 2.71 0.0076* 
Killed  0.0008953 0.000276 3.25 0.0015* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  0.0000236 1.013e-5 2.33 0.0212* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
 
  -0.000865 0.000276  -3.14 0.0021* 
Disaster Type[Flood]*(Killed-3616.27)  0.0017209 0.000551 3.12 0.0022* 
 
The summary shows us that while the former directional relationship holds, the percentage 
change of donations based on changes in number of people killed depends on the type of 
disaster. We will look at both of the base models in examining the fit of the model with the 
addition of the Gini coefficient and the Corruption Perception Index.  
 
B. Effect of inequality on international aid amount  
Adding Gini coefficient to the model, the logarithm of the grand total of international donations 
is fitted against disaster type, killed, estimated damage and Gini coefficient. The effects test is 
summarized below in Table 5.  
TABLE 5— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/GINI 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 45.610931 4.3890 0.0145* 
Killed    1 1 63.552220 12.2310 0.0007* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 25.907353 4.9860 0.0275* 
Gini    1 1 22.578063 4.3453 0.0393* 
 
The R-squared for this model is 0.24, higher than the R-squared of the base model without 
interaction. The interaction variable was then fitted to understand if the interaction variable 
would help explain more of the noise in the model. The findings are summarized in Table 6.  
 
 
TABLE 5— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/GINI AND INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 39.100171 4.1054 0.0190* 
Killed    1 1 62.862825 13.2009 0.0004* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 24.356357 5.1147 0.0256* 
Gini    1 1 10.038624 2.1081 0.1492 
Disaster Type*Killed    2 2 60.301565 6.3315 0.0025* 
 
The R-squared for this model is 0.323. Like what we found in the base model, the 
interaction variable accounts for much more of the data and is found to have a significant 
coefficient. What is unexpected, however, is how the Gini coefficient became an insignificant 
variable at both the five and ten percent confidence level with the addition of the interaction 
variable. This points to the fact that the interaction variable has an interaction with the disaster 
type*killed variable. Based on the higher p-value shown in the disaster type F-test in the model 
with Gini and Interaction Variable, it is likely that the disaster type is related to the Gini. A 
potential explanation for this finding is the idea that certain disasters are more likely to happen to 
a set number of countries. For example, the Philippines is more likely to experience storms and 
typhoons, rather than earthquakes. Since the Philippines has a set Gini for every year, the disaster 
type may help indirectly tell the same story the Gini is telling in predicting percentage change in 
total donations. The parameter estimates of the base model with Gini is summarized below in 
Table 6 for an understanding about the nature of the relationship between Gini and log of grand 
total of international donation.  
 
TABLE 6— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL W/ GINI 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  16.894684 1.130068 14.95 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
ti it )] 
 0.4676741 0.350672 1.33 0.1849 
Disaster Type[Flood]   -0.83167 0.281636  -2.95 0.0038* 
Killed  3.6127e-5 1.033e-5 3.50 0.0007* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  2.358e-5 1.056e-5 2.23 0.0275* 
Gini   -0.056867 0.02728  -2.08 0.0393* 
 
 
 The table shows us that the Gini and the log of the independent variable have a 
significant coefficient estimate of -.0569. A negative relationship implies that the increase of 
inequality leads to a decrease in the percentage change in international donations.  
 
 
 
C. Effect of corruption on international aid amount  
 
In a similar fashion to the exploration of Gini, the CPI is added to the base model, fitted with 
estimated damages, number of people killed and disaster type. The findings of the effects test are 
summarized in Table 6 below. The R-squared of this model was .285, a higher fit than both the 
base model and the base model with the addition of the Gini.  
 TABLE 6— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/CPI 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 45.781633 4.6596 0.0112* 
Killed    1 1 53.429486 10.8761 0.0013* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 55.349760 11.2670 0.0010* 
CPI    1 1 38.578112 7.8529 0.0059* 
 
The CPI is highly significant in this model. The parameters test summarized in Table 7 reveals 
more about the nature of the relationship between CPI and donation amount.  
TABLE 7— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL W/ CPI 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  16.111165 0.579098 27.82 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
ti it )] 
 0.5887066 0.33233 1.77 0.0789 
Disaster Type[Flood]   -0.818444 0.268202  -3.05 0.0028* 
Killed  2.817e-5 8.542e-6 3.30 0.0013* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  3.7381e-5 1.114e-5 3.36 0.0010* 
CPI   -0.480505 0.171468  -2.80 0.0059* 
 
The parameter estimate noted above for the CPI is -.0.48, which indicates an inverse relationship 
between CPI and the log of grand total of donations. While both the coefficient is negative, the 
result of this model gives us a puzzling result: the more corrupt the nation, the higher the log of 
grand total of international aid.  
We now examine the effect of the addition of the interaction variable on the result of the 
model. The effects test of the base model with CPI and interaction variable are summarized 
below in Table 8.  
TABLE 8— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/CPI AND INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 27.103965 2.8788 0.0600 
Killed    1 1 37.061992 7.8729 0.0058* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 49.453672 10.5051 0.0015* 
CPI    1 1 30.918673 6.5679 0.0116* 
Disaster Type*Killed    2 2 35.041427 3.7218 0.0270* 
 
The R-square of this variable is 0.326, showing a similar fit to the addition of the 
interaction variable for the Gini coefficient. Though CPI seems to be a more robust indicator, it 
is clear that CPI and Gini are related in some way, which takes away from each other. A quick 
scatterplot shows us that the two are weakly related with an R factor of 0.112. This seems to 
align with findings by Gupta et al. which notes that higher corruption is positively correlated 
with higher inequality and poverty rates18.  
 
D. Effect of both inequality and corruption on aid amount  
A fit of the model with both CPI and Gini variables confirm that this relationship does in fact 
disperse the effect of the CPI and Gini. The combination, does however, produce a slightly 
higher R-squared factor of 0.291, pointing to the fact that while the two are related, they do in 
fact measure disparate aspect of society that cannot be substituted for each other. The effects test 
for the base model with Gini and CPI are summarized in Table 9 below.  
 
 
TABLE 9— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/GINI AND CPI  
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 48.699582 4.7828 0.0102* 
Killed    1 1 45.976590 9.0308 0.0033* 
                                                          
18 Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and 
poverty?. Economics of governance, 3(1), 23-45. 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 45.458721 8.9290 0.0035* 
Gini    1 1 15.612705 3.0667 0.0827 
CPI    1 1 21.635360 4.2496 0.0416* 
 
 While there is definitely a dispersion of effect with the combination of Gini and CPI to 
the model, at the 10 percent level both Gini and CPI seems to have an effect on the log of grand 
total of aid. As we have done in the models previously, the disaster*killed interaction variable is 
added for comparison purposes. The effects test is summarized in Table 10 below.  
TABLE 10— EFFECTS TEST OF MODEL W/GINI, CPI AND INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Sq. F Ratio Prob > F 
      
Disaster Type    2 2 31.914883 3.3961 0.0371* 
Killed    1 1 54.989636 11.7031 0.0009* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)    1 1 39.158273 8.3338 0.0047* 
Gini    1 1 7.488542 1.5937 0.2095 
CPI    1 1 15.024206 3.1975 0.0766 
Disaster Type*Killed    2 2 52.561016 5.5931 0.0049* 
 
R square of 0.357 for the model shown in Table 10 show that the best fit among all the 
models seen in this paper is one in which the Gini, CPI and Disaster Type*Killed variable are all 
included. However, the F-ratio for the Gini Coefficient is less than one with the p-value being 
extremely high. CPI, on the other hand seems to withstand the dispersion effect and remains 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL W/ CPI AND GINI 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  17.879669 1.179818 15.15 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
 
 0.5516388 0.36998 1.49 0.1388 
Disaster Type[Flood]   -0.884371 0.286089  -3.09 0.0025* 
Killed  3.1887e-5 1.061e-5 3.01 0.0033* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  3.4733e-5 1.162e-5 2.99 0.0035* 
Gini   -0.049563 0.028303  -1.75 0.0827 
CPI   -0.410788 0.19927  -2.06 0.0416* 
 
TABLE 12— PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF BASE MODEL W/ CPI, GINI AND INTERACTION VARIABLE 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
      
Intercept  16.86254 1.174379 14.36 <.0001* 
Disaster Type[Earthquake (seismic 
 
  -2.671555 1.033753  -2.58 0.0111* 
Disaster Type[Flood]  2.5975463 1.747185 1.49 0.1400 
Killed  0.0011409 0.000334 3.42 0.0009* 
Est. Damage (US$ Million)  3.2312e-5 1.119e-5 2.89 0.0047* 
 
Tables 11 and 12 above do not provide any new insights, but rather show us consistency 
of the relationships that have been identified in other trials of the model; mainly, that Gini and 
CPI both have a negative relationship with the independent Y variable.  
 
E. Final Discussion 
The results section has provided a wealth of interesting sights as it pertains to the original 
questions. Most notably the Corruption Perception Index seems to have a robust relationship 
with the donations. As aforementioned, it seems puzzling that a more corrupt government enjoys 
greater amounts of donations pouring into the economy after a natural disaster. A closer look at 
the dataset provides a potential explanations: these donations trickle into two channels; external 
agencies and bilateral governments. It is possible that the higher percentage of donations for 
every unit change in CPI is due to an increase in flow to external agencies because the 
international community does not trust the government to take care of the needs of all of the 
affect. Rather, it may potentially privilege the socially elite.  
The Gini coefficient, while has a weaker relationship and its relationship should be re-
examined,19 seems to provide a more intuitive answer. Inequality, like corruption, affects the 
distribution of resources. A negative parameter estimate for the Gini indicate that a more unequal 
country may get more donations. The potential explanation may be to help those at the bottom of 
the pyramid in the recovery process. While the study is not casual in any way, and a very 
different study would have to be conducted to examine if corruption and inequality actually drive 
differing donation amounts, this study does find a significant relationship.  
Finally, an unintentional but nevertheless interesting finding is in the dispersion effect 
created by the disaster*killed interaction variable on inequality and corruption. While there is no 
conclusive findings as to their relationship, curiosity is peaked as to the potential connection. Is it 
that even with the same disaster type, different numbers of people become casualties based on a 
country’s inequality and corruption profile? One can imagine a situation where there is death at 
impact of the disaster but also death in the aftermaths of the disaster that is intertwined with the 
access to resources. While other future research considerations will be discussed in greater depth 
in the next section, the finding begs a deeper exploration of the relationship.  
 
III. Limitations and Future Research  
The study provides preliminary findings on the relationship between inequality, corruption 
and donation of aid. Regardless, there are clear limitations of the study. First, by the pure fact 
                                                          
19 See next section for potential next steps for re-examination of Gini coefficient data 
that this is a statistical analysis of phenomenon, there is a lot of noise. With the R-square factor 
of .35, the model is not comprehensive in identifying the factors that drive aid donations during 
natural disasters. While it is to be expected of real-world data, it is regardless a limitation worth 
noting.  
Second, a closer look at the data identified not only is a disaster type more likely to occur to 
some countries, but those countries geologically vulnerable to natural disasters will occur 
repeatedly. Since there is only one Gini coefficient, those country’s Gini coefficients are 
weighted more heavily than other that may have fewer disasters in the data set.  
Finally, outliers, mediated for the independent variable through logarithm exist for the 
dependent variables as well. The Nepalese and Japanese earthquakes had significantly higher 
deaths than the typical earthquake, skewing the data. The highly irregular data points make 
estimation difficult.  
Moving forward, an examination of bilateral versus external donations of a country based on 
their corruption profiles will be worthwhile study in more closely identifying the relationship 
between corruption and international disaster aid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Bibliography  
Aldrich, D. P. (2011). The power of people: Social capital's role in recovery from the 
1995 kobe earthquake. Natural Hazards, 56(3), 595-611. 
 
Barro, R. J. (1999). Inequality, growth, and investment (No. w7038). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Becerra, O., Cavallo, E., & Noy, I. (2014). Foreign aid in the aftermath of large natural 
disasters. Review of Development Economics, 18(3), 445-460 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income 
inequality and poverty?. Economics of governance, 3(1), 23-45. 
Kawachi, Ichiro, et al. "Social capital, income inequality, and mortality."American 
journal of public health 87.9 (1997): 1491-1498. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-
country investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(4), 1251-1288. 
          Leaning, J., & Guha-Sapir, D. (2013). Natural disasters, armed conflict, and public 
health. N Engl J Med, 369(19), 1836-1842. 
 
 Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 681-712. 
 
       Méon, P. G., & Weill, L. (2010). Is corruption an efficient grease?. World 
development, 38(3), 244-259. 
Riebeek, H. (2005, March 25). The Rising Cost of Natural Hazards : Feature Articles. 
Retrieved April 25, 2016, from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/RisingCost/ 
Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of 
generalized trust. Comparative politics, 441-459. 
Strömberg, D.. (2007). Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian 
Aid. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,21(3), 199–222. 
Theobald, R. (1990). What is Corruption?. In Corruption, Development and 
Underdevelopment (pp. 1-18). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Toya, H., & Skidmore, M. (2007). Economic development and the impacts of natural 
disasters. Economics Letters, 94(1), 20-25. 
  
